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CAN YOU UNDERSTAND THIS MESSAGE?
AN EXAMINATION OF HURLEY V.
IRISH-AMERICAN GAY, LESBIAN &
BISEXUAL GROUP OF BOSTON’S IMPACT
ON SPENCE V. WASHINGTON
SANDY TOMASIK†
INTRODUCTION
A twelve-year-old student went to school wearing a red-,
white-, and blue-beaded necklace.1 According to the child, she
wore the necklace to show her support for the soldiers fighting in
Iraq, some of whom were people in her family, and to
demonstrate her love of the United States.2 However, upon
arriving at school, she was informed that she could no longer
wear the necklace because it could be considered “gang related.”3
If she did not comply with this warning, she would be “subjected
to discipline.”4
The schoolgirl brought an action against the school district
asserting that its policy and its enforcement violated her First
Amendment rights.5 In analyzing whether this activity was
protected as speech under the First Amendment, the Northern
District of New York noted that one’s support for the soldiers
might not express a particularized message.6 Moreover, the court
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1
Grzywna ex rel. Doe v. Schenectady Cent. Sch. Dist., 489 F. Supp. 2d 139, 142
(N.D.N.Y. 2006).
2
Id.
3
Id. The plaintiff began wearing the necklace in early January 2005, and the
school told her to take it off on January 4, 2005. Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 144. This is the first factor in determining whether the First
Amendment protects conduct as symbolic speech under the Spence test. See infra
Part I.B.
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stated that people do not automatically associate red, white, and
blue with demonstrating support for the troops.7 Nevertheless,
the court held that the claim withstood a motion to dismiss.8
Conversely,
in
another
instance,
four
non-profit
organizations engaged in voter-registration activities in
politically underrepresented communities.9 The New Mexico
legislature
passed
legislation
that
restricted
the
voter-registration activities of third-party organizations,
hindering the organizations’ ability to help citizens register to
vote.10 These organizations brought an action alleging that this
legislation violateed their right to free speech.11 The court found
that the plaintiffs “pled facts sufficient to support their
First-Amendment claims.”12 In deciding that the plaintiffs
sufficiently pled First Amendment claims, the court first
determined that the plaintiffs intended to convey a particularized
message with their conduct.13
With the voter-registration
activities, the non-profit organizations intended to convey a
message that “voting is important, that the Plaintiffs believe in
civic participation, and that the Plaintiffs are willing to expend
the resources to broaden the electorate to include allegedly
under-served communities.”14 Moreover, the court believed that
people observing the voter-registration efforts would likely
understand this message.15
Each of the previous two cases highlights the difficulty of
identifying whether conduct is protected as symbolic speech
under the First Amendment and, specifically, how particularized
the message needs to be in order to receive protection. The
original test for determining whether conduct could be protected
7
Grzywna, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 146. This is the second factor in determining
whether the First Amendment protects conduct as symbolic speech under the Spence
test. See infra Part I.B.
8
Grzywna, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 146–47. This ruling was on a motion to dismiss,
and since the court found that there was “more than a ‘plausible contention’ that
[the plaintiff’s] conduct [was] expressive,” the claim was not dismissed. Id. at 142,
144–45.
9
Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Herrera, 690 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1189
(D.N.M. 2010).
10
Id.
11
See id.
12
Id. at 1214. This decision came on a motion to dismiss, and so the quoted
language is the standard used in deciding such a motion. Id. at 1188, 1193.
13
Id. at 1215.
14
Id. at 1215–16.
15
Id. at 1216.
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as speech was laid out in Spence v. Washington.16 According to
the Court, to be engaged in protected speech, the actor needs to
have the “intent to convey a particularized message.”17
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston18 potentially altered this test.19 There, the Court stated
that a “narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”20
Therefore, the question has arisen whether the intent to convey a
particularized message is necessary anymore, and the circuit
courts have addressed this precise issue quite differently.21
Because the freedom of speech is a fundamental right that
has long been protected by the First Amendment,22 it is very
important that the lower courts apply predictable tests when
analyzing whether speech is protected. This constitutional
safeguard is necessary to assure the uninhibited exchange of
ideas, ranging from political to social topics.23 In fact, “it is a
prized American privilege to speak one’s mind, although not
always with perfect good taste.”24
This Note analyzes the effect that Hurley had on the Spence
factors and suggests that the particularized requirement has
been lowered. This is the best approach to encouraging speech
while balancing other important interests. Part I discusses the
development of the freedom of speech, from protecting the spoken
and written word to protecting expressive conduct. Part II
outlines the different approaches taken by the circuit courts in
deciding whether conduct is protected as speech and, in
particular, what effect Hurley had on Spence. Part III critically
analyzes each of these approaches and concludes that the
Eleventh Circuit’s approach is the most sound. Finally, Part IV

16

418 U.S. 405, 415 (1974) (per curiam).
Id. at 410–11; see also infra Part I.B (explaining the second prong of the test).
18
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
19
Id. at 569.
20
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411).
21
See infra Part II.
22
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . .”).
23
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
24
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941).
17
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applies the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits’ tests to a
district court case in order to illustrate the differences between
the approaches and the importance of this problem.
I.
A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYMBOLIC SPEECH

Recognition That Conduct Could Be Protected

The Supreme Court first recognized that speech is not just
limited to the spoken or written word in Stromberg v.
California.25 In Stromberg, the appellant, a member of the
Young Communist League, was convicted of displaying a red flag
that represented her opposition to the government—an action
banned by a state statute.26 On appeal from the District Court of
Appeals of the State of California, the appellant claimed that
“the statute was invalid as being ‘an unwarranted limitation on
the right of free speech.’ ”27 The Supreme Court ruled that the
statute was unconstitutional.28 The Court recognized that people
could display such flags for peaceful purposes, such as to signal
opposition to the political party in power, or opposition to
government more generally.29
A few years later, symbolic speech was protected again in
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.30
In
Barnette, the appellees challenged a resolution ordering that
saluting the American flag become a regular part of the school
day and stating that refusal to salute the flag is
insubordination.31 The Supreme Court held that the flag salute
was a form of speech.32 “Symbolism is a primitive but effective
way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to
symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a
short cut from mind to mind.”33 The Court noted that the flag is
a symbol of adherence to the present government, requiring an
25

283 U.S. 359 (1931).
Id. at 360, 362. The pertinent statute read: “Any person who displays a red
flag . . . in any public place or in any meeting place or public assembly, or from or on
ahy [sic] house, building or window as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to
organized government . . . is guilty of a felony.” Id. at 361.
27
Id. at 364.
28
Id. at 369–70.
29
Id. at 369.
30
319 U.S. 624 (1943).
31
Id. at 627, 629.
32
Id. at 632.
33
Id.
26
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individual to communicate and accept the flag’s ideas.34
Therefore, the mandatory flag salute contravened the First
Amendment.35
B.

The Spence Test

Once the Supreme Court decided to protect conduct under
the First Amendment, it was faced with the question of when
conduct should be protected. In other words, was all conduct to
be protected as speech, or did protection have to be restricted in
some way?
That answer came in 1974 with Spence v.
Washington.36 In Spence, a college student hung an American
flag from his window upside down, with a peace symbol made of
tape attached to the front and back of the flag.37 Following his
arrest for violating a statute banning such behavior,38 the
student testified that he affixed the peace symbol on the flag and
displayed it as a way to protest the recent American invasion of
Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University, and to
demonstrate that he thought America stood for peace.39 A jury
ultimately convicted the student for violating the statute.40
The student challenged his conviction on the ground that the
statute violated his First Amendment rights.41 In deciding
whether the First Amendment protected these actions, the
Supreme Court explained that it is “necessary to determine
whether [this] activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication
to
fall
within
the
scope
of
the
42
First . . . Amendment[].” The Court looked at the circumstances
surrounding the conduct: The student’s actions coincided with
the American invasion of Cambodia and the killings at Kent
State, which were highly publicized.43 Therefore, the Court
concluded that “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message
34

Id. at 633.
Id. at 642.
36
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
37
Id. at 406.
38
Id. at 405–07. The statute read: “No person shall, in any manner, for
exhibition or display: (1) Place or cause to be placed any . . . mark . . . of any nature
upon any flag . . . of the United States . . . .” Id. at 407 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
39
Id. at 408.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 406.
42
Id. at 409.
43
Id. at 410.
35
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was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood
was great that the message would be understood by those who
viewed it.”44 Thus, the First Amendment protected the student’s
conduct as symbolic speech.45 This two-part inquiry to determine
whether conduct is protected speech became known as the Spence
test.46
C.

Hurley’s Statement

Difficulty and confusion ensued following the Court’s later
decision in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston.47 In Hurley, parade organizers refused to allow
an openly gay, lesbian, and bisexual group to march in a
parade.48 In response to a First Amendment challenge by the
parade organizers, the state court ruled that the parade had no
common theme other than involving participants.49
The
organizers were not selective in choosing participants, and they
failed to circumscribe participants’ messages.50 Therefore, the
parade lacked the expressive purpose necessary to fall under the
First Amendment.51
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the
parade was a form of expressive speech.52 The Court asserted
that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”53
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that a private speaker’s
action does not lose First Amendment protection just because it

44

Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 415.
46
James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message from Mind to Mind,
61 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2008). Often, the test is called the Spence-Johnson test
because these factors were affirmed in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
See Cressman v. Thompson, 719 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir. 2013) (calling the test
the “Spence-Johnson factors”). However, this Note refers to the test as the Spence
test.
47
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
48
Id. at 561.
49
Id. at 562–63.
50
Id. at 563.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 566.
53
Id. at 569 (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411
(1974) (per curiam)).
45
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contains “multifarious voices” or fails to have an isolated, “exact
message as the exclusive subject matter of the speech.”54 This
statement has given rise to the split among the circuits regarding
Hurley’s effect on the Spence factors.
II. HURLEY’S EFFECT ON THE SPENCE FACTORS: THE CIRCUIT
SPLIT
A.

The Sixth and Ninth Circuits: Applying Spence and Hurley
Together

The Sixth and the Ninth Circuits seem to apply the Spence
factors together with Hurley’s statement that a “narrow,
succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection.”55 The Sixth Circuit took this approach in Blau v.
Fort Thomas Public School District.56 In Blau, the court held
that wearing one’s choice of clothing was not a form of protected
speech.57 There, a school had instituted a dress code, which was
challenged by a student as infringing her freedom of speech.58
The student said she wished to wear clothes that looked nice on
her, that she felt good in, and that expressed her individuality.59
In analyzing whether the plaintiff could have a free speech
claim, the Sixth Circuit indicated that claimants have to show
that their conduct conveys a particularized message, and that the
likelihood is great that those who view it would understand the
message.60 According to the court, “The threshold is not a
difficult one, as ‘a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a
condition of constitutional protection.’ ”61

54

Id. at 569–70.
Id. at 569.
56
401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir. 2005).
57
Id. at 389.
58
Id. at 385–86. Among some of the things the new dress code banned were
revealing clothing and baggy clothing; visible body piercings, other than ear
piercings; clothes with holes in them; and tops with writing on them. Id.
59
Id. at 386. In fact, the student specifically said that there was no “particular
message” that she wanted to convey through her clothing. Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
60
Id. at 388 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per
curiam)).
61
Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).
55

FINAL_TOMASIK

272

10/7/2015 7:13 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:265

However, even with a lower threshold, the court still found
that the student was not engaging in a form of protected speech.62
Instead, the student had only a “generalized and vague desire to
express her . . . individuality,” something the First Amendment
does not protect.63 Indeed, to rule for the student would
eliminate the requirement that the conduct have an identifiable
message and would also depreciate the First Amendment in
cases where a particularized message is present.64
The Ninth Circuit similarly applied the Spence factors
together with Hurley’s statement in Kaahumanu v. Hawaii.65 In
Kaahumanu, the Ninth Circuit held that a wedding was
protected as symbolic speech.66 The Hawaii Department of Land
and Resources required couples to obtain permits and satisfy
other terms and conditions in order to have beach weddings.67 A
pastor and an association that provided commercial weddings
challenged the new requirements, claiming that the
requirements unduly burdened their right to organize and
participate in weddings, violating the First Amendment.68
In determining whether the plaintiffs stated a First
Amendment violation, the Ninth Circuit articulated that the
amendment protects expressive conduct “so long as that conduct
‘convey[s] a particularized message’ and is likely to be understood
in the surrounding circumstances.”69 “A ‘narrow, succinctly
articulable message’ is not required.”70 Using this standard, the
court concluded that a wedding ceremony was a form of symbolic
speech.71 According to the court, the particularized message was
one about the couple, their beliefs, and their relationship to each
other and to the community, as well as a celebration of marriage
and uniting two people in a long-term relationship.72 First
62

Id. at 389.
Id. at 389–90.
64
Id. at 390.
65
682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012).
66
Id. at 799.
67
Id. at 794–95. The terms and conditions included a ban on alcohol, chairs, and
tables, and a two-hour maximum to perform the wedding. Id.
68
Id. at 793, 795.
69
Id. at 798 (citing Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (per
curiam)).
70
Id. (citing Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S.
557, 569 (1995)).
71
Id. at 799.
72
Id.
63
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Amendment protection for this activity could not be ignored just
because actors combined “multifarious voices” or failed “to edit
their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject
matter of the speech.”73
B.

The Eleventh Circuit: The Liberalized Test

Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit sees Hurley as having
relaxed or “liberalized” the Spence test.74 The Eleventh Circuit
took this approach in Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland75
when it held that raising a fist during the Pledge of Allegiance
was expressive conduct.76 In Holloman, a child was punished for
refusing to recite the Pledge of Allegiance.77 A day later, the
plaintiff, a student at the same school, did not say the Pledge of
Allegiance and raised his fist in the air during the pledge
instead.78 When summoned to the principal’s office, the plaintiff
explained that he raised his fist to protest what happened to the
child the previous day, and the plaintiff was subsequently
punished for his actions.79
The plaintiff brought an action in which he alleged that the
defendants’ actions infringed his First Amendment rights.80 In
order to determine whether this action was speech, the Eleventh
Circuit opined that Hurley “liberalized” the Spence test.81 The
issue for the court was “whether the reasonable person would
interpret [the conduct] as some sort of message, not whether an
observer would necessarily infer a specific message.”82 Using this
new test, the court concluded that at least some students would
have recognized the raising of the fist as a protest over the
punishment of the boy the day before.83 Even if students were
not aware of this specific message, the raised fist expressed a
“generalized message of disagreement or protest” toward either
73

Id. (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
75
370 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2004).
76
Id. at 1261, 1270.
77
Id. at 1260.
78
Id. at 1261.
79
Id. The punishment normally would have been three days of detention and
the postponement of receiving a diploma until detention ended, but the plaintiff
chose instead to get a paddling in order to receive his diploma. See id.
80
Id. at 1259.
81
Id. at 1270.
82
Id.
83
Id.
74
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the school or the United States.84 Although not specifically
stated by the court, the other part of the test would seem to be
whether the actor intended to convey some sort of message.85
This also fits within the court’s observation that Hurley
“liberalized” the Spence test.
C.

The Third Circuit: Spence Factors as Signposts and
Eliminating the Particularized Requirement

Some courts have concluded that Hurley eliminated the
“particularized” aspect of the Spence test so that now the factors
are “signposts,” rather than requirements; this is the approach
the Third Circuit took in Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of
Tenafly.86 In Tenafly, the Third Circuit held that Orthodox Jews’
act of attaching religious items known as lechis to utility poles
was not protected speech.87 In reaching this conclusion, the
Third Circuit stated that there was no language in Spence
suggesting that (1) an intent to convey a particularized message
that (2) would be understood by those who viewed it were
necessary factors.88 According to the court, conduct would be
expressive if, “considering ‘the nature of [the] activity, combined
with the factual context and environment in which it was
undertaken,’ . . . the ‘activity was sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication.’ ”89
The court focused on two
questions: (1) whether the actor intended subjectively for his
conduct to communicate with people whom he expected to
observe the conduct, and (2) whether observers would
understand the message that the actor intended his conduct to
convey.90
84

Id. The court also hinted that the raised fist could constitute pure speech,
meaning that the raised fist “does not contain any of the substantive ‘non-speech’
elements that are necessary to remove something from the realm of ‘pure speech’
into the realm of expressive conduct.” Id. Yet, the court concluded that the raised fist
is still protected by the First Amendment, whether it is symbolic speech or pure
speech. Id.
85
See id. (concluding that the raised fist expressed a generalized message of
protest or disagreement).
86
309 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Troster v. Pa. State Dep’t of Corr., 65
F.3d 1086, 1090 & n.1 (3d Cir. 1995)).
87
Id. at 155, 161. Lechis are thin black strips made of plastic. Id. at 152; see
infra note 92 (explaining the purpose of lechis).
88
Id. at 160 (citing Troster, 65 F.3d at 1090 n.1).
89
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Troster, 65 F.3d at 1090).
90
Id. at 161 (citing Troster, 65 F.3d at 1091–92).
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Using this test, the court found that affixing the religious
items to the poles was not expressive activity that would be
protected.91 The Third Circuit found that the intended audience
was not the general public, but rather other Orthodox Jews
because it was for their benefit.92 Moreover, the items were not
expressing a message that would be understood by anyone but
instead were used for a purely functional purpose.93 Thus,
because there was no message behind the hanging of these
religious items that could be understood by the intended
audience, the conduct was not protected as symbolic speech.
D. The Second Circuit: Spence Factors as “Intact”
Conversely, the Second Circuit believes that the Spence
factors remain “intact” after Hurley.94 In Church of American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik,95 the Second Circuit took
this approach and held that wearing masks was not symbolic
speech.96 In Kerik, members of the American Knights, a group
that identifies with the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”), applied for a
permit to demonstrate while wearing masks.97 However, the
New York City Police Department denied the application on the
ground that wearing the masks would violate a New York
statute.98 The members sought an injunction against the police
department to allow the group to wear its masks while
demonstrating.99 While the decision denying the injunction was
stayed, the group conducted its protest with robes and hoods but
without masks.100

91

Id.
Id. at 162. This is because the religious item was used to demarcate the
boundaries within which Orthodox Jews could travel during a religious holiday. See
id. at 152.
93
Id. at 162.
94
See infra notes 101 and 103 and accompanying text.
95
356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
96
Id. at 205 & n.6, 208 (citing Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319
(2d Cir. 2003)).
97
Id. at 199–200.
98
Id. at 200–01. The statute provided that a person is guilty of loitering when
such person “[b]eing masked . . . loiters, remains or congregates in a public place
with other persons so masked or disguised, or knowingly permits or aids persons so
masked or disguised to congregate in a public place.” Id. at 201.
99
Id.
100
Id.
92
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When the case reached the Second Circuit, the court stated
that it had “interpreted Hurley to leave intact the Supreme
Court’s test for expressive conduct in [Spence].”101 The Second
Circuit reached this conclusion by citing Zalewska v. County of
Sullivan.102 According to Zalewska:
To be sufficiently imbued with communicative elements, an
activity need not necessarily embody a narrow, succinctly
articulable message, but the reviewing court must find, at the
very least, an intent to convey a particularized message along
with a great likelihood that the message will be understood by
those viewing it.103

Applying this standard, the court in Kerik found that the wearing
of the masks was not protected speech because the mask itself
did not convey a message independently of the robe and hood.104
In other words, the audience would conclude that the members of
the American Knights were associated with the KKK just by
looking at the robe and hood; the mask did nothing to add to that
impression.105
III. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHY THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT IS CORRECT
A.

The Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: Correct Both
Textually and Policy-Wise

The Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s approach106 is textually sound.
By first stating that the intent to convey a particularized
message needs to be present, but then stating a “narrow,
succinctly articulable message” is not required,107 these circuits
have essentially lowered the particularized requirement, rather

101

Id. at 205 n.6.
316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003).
103
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also infra Part
III.C (pointing out the similarity of this statement to the Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s
approach, but explaining why the Second Circuit’s test is different).
104
356 F.3d at 206.
105
Id.
106
See supra notes 60–61, 69–70 and accompanying text.
107
Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hurley v.
Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995)); Blau v.
Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 388 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hurley, 515
U.S. at 569).
102

FINAL_TOMASIK

2015]

10/7/2015 7:13 PM

CAN YOU UNDERSTAND THIS MESSAGE?

277

than just clarifying it.108
In fact, the factual scenario in
Kaahumanu closely mirrors the factual scenario in Hurley
because, like a parade, a wedding combines multifarious
messages, such as messages about the couple and their beliefs, as
well as their relationship to the community and to each other.109
Just as the point of a parade is to express a message,110 the core
message of a wedding is a celebration of marriage and uniting
two people in a lifelong relationship.111 Because the facts of
Kaahumanu closely parallel the facts of Hurley, the Ninth and
Sixth Circuits have correctly stated that Hurley lowered the
threshold of the first Spence factor.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s approach was best phrased by
the Eleventh Circuit, which explicitly stated that Hurley
“liberalized” the Spence test by lowering the particularized
requirement.112 In the Eleventh Circuit, the new test would be
whether a reasonable person would understand some sort of
message, not whether an observer would necessarily infer a
specific message.113
One of the benefits of the Eleventh Circuit’s test is that it is
pragmatic. An audience might not be able to understand the
specific message the actor intended to convey, but the audience
might be able to understand a different message.114 Yet, the
conduct would still be protected as symbolic speech.115 This
108
See infra Part III.C (distinguishing the Sixth and Ninth Circuit’s test from
the Second Circuit’s test, which uses very similar language).
109
Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 799 (citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70).
110
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 568.
111
Kaahumanu, 682 F.3d at 799.
112
Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569).
113
Id.
114
Compare Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (finding that a student had particularized the
message of expressing her gender identity by wearing feminine clothing, and that
the audience would understand that exact message), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton
Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000),
with Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1270 (“Even if students were not aware of the specific
message Holloman was attempting to convey, his fist clearly expressed a generalized
message of disagreement or protest directed toward . . . the school, or the country in
general.”), and Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]t
is difficult to see how Zalewska’s broad message would be readily understood by
those viewing her since no particularized communication can be divined simply from
a woman wearing a skirt.”).
115
See Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1270 (“Even if students were not aware of the
specific message Holloman was attempting to convey, his fist clearly expressed a
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strikes the right balance between protecting an individual’s right
to free speech and the Supreme Court’s admonition that not
everything can be considered speech.116 For example, the conduct
of wearing a skirt to express cultural values in Zalewska would
still probably not be protected under the Eleventh Circuit’s test
because no one would understand that message, or any other
message, from wearing a skirt.117 That could be contrasted with
a situation like Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, in which
the raising of a fist to protest another student’s punishment,
which has some particularization, was protected because
students could infer multiple messages, although not a particular
one.118
Protecting speech where the audience does not
understand the exact same message the actor intends to convey
is beneficial: An actor like the student in Holloman clearly
intended to express a message, and protection should not hinge
on the audience’s ability to perceive that same message, as long
as it could understand some message from the conduct. This is
especially true if conduct could convey multiple messages, yet the
actor intended to convey only one message.119
One could argue that allowing an audience to understand a
different message from the one the actor intended to convey does
not serve the conception of the First Amendment as maintaining
the “marketplace of ideas.”120 According to this theory, there is a
seller with an idea, and there is a buyer looking for an idea.121
All ideas should enter into the marketplace of ideas so that
individual buyers can pick and choose which ideas to accept from
sellers.122
Therefore, if an audience-buyer understands a
different message from the one the actors-sellers intended their
generalized message of disagreement or protest directed toward . . . the school, or
the country in general.”). In fact, there is even a suggestion that Spence itself only
required that the audience understand some message, not the particular message
the actor intended the conduct to convey. Laurie Magid, Note, First Amendment
Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467, 486 (1984).
116
See infra note 138 and accompanying text; see also infra Part III.B–C
(arguing that the Third Circuit protects too much conduct, while the Second Circuit
protects too little conduct).
117
316 F.3d at 320.
118
370 F.3d at 1270.
119
See Magid, supra note 115, at 478.
120
See Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” Revisited, 58 WAYNE
L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2013).
121
See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
122
See Sedler, supra note 120.
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conduct to convey, the marketplace of ideas is altered so that the
roles of actors and sellers are not as important: They do not have
to put as much effort into communicating their exact message.
Therefore, maybe the particularization of the conduct is
important to this theory insofar as it helps an audience
understand the exact message the actor intended to
communicate.
Yet, courts should not protect the marketplace of ideas at the
expense of an individual’s autonomy. The First Amendment’s
primary and most important purpose is to “protect all forms of
peaceful expression in all of its myriad manifestations.”123 “While
not all cases provide a clear answer to [whether something is
symbolic speech], courts should err on the side of protecting
expression.”124 The courts have emphasized this on multiple
occasions because they have recognized the importance of
protecting an individual’s freedom, as compared to other goals.125
In fact, to have a marketplace of ideas, individual autonomy
needs to be protected: Individuals must be willing to come
forward with a message they would like to express in a
marketplace.
The Eleventh Circuit’s test protects individual autonomy as
a primary goal in two ways. First, actors’ freedom in expressing
themselves through their conduct is protected by lowering the
particularized requirement. If there is a chance that their
conduct will not be protected as speech just because it is not
particularized enough, people may be deterred from engaging in
such conduct.126
Second, allowing the audience to understand a different
message from the one the actor intended to convey protects
individuals’ freedom in self-expression.
If an audience
understands a different message from the one the actor intended
123
Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 694 (2d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added)
(citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977)).
124
James M. Gottry, Note, Just Shoot Me: Public Accommodation AntiDiscrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 961, 1000 (2011).
125
See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 251,
270–80 (2011) (highlighting cases where the Supreme Court recognized the need to
protect autonomy).
126
See LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 78–79 (1988) (“The very
likely prospect of [failing to protect the liberty of speech] would itself have an
inhibiting effect on expression, for . . . many people will choose not to exercise their
liberty for fear they would be the victims of those systemic failures . . . .”).
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to convey, and the First Amendment would protect that conduct,
people are more likely to express themselves. This security,
then, is important for protecting a person’s autonomy in
self-expression.
Because of this greater degree of autonomy, a larger, more
diverse group of people can communicate with a wider variety of
messages.127 This is particularly true because many people may
not be able to express their intent in a particularized way, yet
they may still have a message they want to convey. It is
especially true because conduct with a wide variety of messages
will still be protected, so long as the audience can understand
some message from it, even if that message is different from the
one the actor intended to convey.128
One may question how the court in Holloman arrived at the
reasonable person standard, because Spence v. Washington
requires that “those who viewed it” understand the message.129
However, this was ambiguous in Spence, because the case itself
suggested two different approaches.130 On the one hand, it could
mean actual viewers, but the Supreme Court probably did not
intend to limit the audience to this circumscribed class because it
explicitly stated that nobody saw Spence’s flag before the police
arrived to take it down.131 Also, the Court did not even consider
the policemen who came to take the flag down as the audience.132
On the other hand, “those who viewed it” could mean
reasonable observers. This standard is a practical approach, for
two reasons. First, it would be difficult to locate and interview
actual observers about what they understood the conduct to
mean.133 Second, if only one actual observer in an audience does
not understand the message the actor intended to convey, would
that mean the actor loses constitutional protection? Surely, an
actor should not lose First Amendment protection just because
one audience member cannot perceive or understand that actor’s
conduct. This would especially be true if the message were not as
127

Magid, supra note 115, at 467.
See supra Part II.B.
129
418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974) (per curiam). This also mirrors the criticism of the
Third Circuit’s statement that there was no language in Spence indicating that the
two factors were necessary factors. See infra Part III.B.
130
Magid, supra note 115, at 485.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 485–86.
128
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particularized as Spence required before Hurley. The Eleventh
Circuit approach handles this problem by focusing on the
reasonable observer.
B.

Criticisms of the Third Circuit: Potentially Correct Textually,
but Not Policy-Wise

While the Third Circuit’s test134 could be correct textually, it
would not produce the wisest policy. Textually, it could be true
that Hurley eliminated the “particularized” requirement of the
Spence test by stating that a narrow, succinctly articulable
message is not a necessary condition. Even if a “narrow,
succinctly articulable message” is not equivalent to being
“particularized,”135 that confusion was eliminated in Hurley, in
which the Supreme Court stated that “a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”136 Thus, the Supreme
Court may have indicated that a message no longer needs to be
particularized in order to receive constitutional protection.
There is room for debate whether eliminating the
“particularized” aspect of the Spence test is a sound approach for
adjudicating symbolic speech cases. On the one hand, there is an
argument that the First Amendment would protect more speech
this way, without regard to how particularized the actors
intended their conduct to be.137 On the other hand, it is just not
feasible for the First Amendment to protect conduct whenever a
person intends to express any idea at all. The Supreme Court
acknowledged this by stating that it “cannot accept the view that
an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’
whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to
express an idea.”138 If one were to take a literal reading of the
134

See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text.
See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
136
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 411 (1974) (per curiam)).
137
Of course, the less particularized a message is, the less likely it is that the
speech will be protected because it would fail the second prong of the Spence test: If
a message is not too particularized, there is a lower likelihood that those who view it
will understand it. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
138
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
135
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first prong of the test and ignore pragmatic thinking, there could
be no limit on what could be protected as speech under that
prong if the actor did not intend to convey a particularized
message.
Thus, there could be a danger that protecting more conduct,
and so safeguarding people’s autonomy, sacrifices other values
that society deems more important than an individual’s right to
self-expression. A group could block a police station because it
thinks that looking at a police station is important; a couple
could walk hand-in-hand in the middle of Fifth Avenue because it
believes publicly displaying affection is healthy for the
relationship. Yet, in each of these instances, there are overriding
public interests, such as the ability to respond to an emergency
and the need for traffic to move, respectively. In such instances,
these actions cannot be recognized as speech.
A degree of particularization is the best tool for determining
whether conduct should be protected, since it would guard
against pretextual claims like the ones above while ensuring that
other interests are protected as well. An advocate of the Third
Circuit’s approach might argue that such interests could also be
served by a balancing test, eliminating the need for a
particularization requirement. For example, in United States v.
O’Brien,139 the Court held, in part, that regulation of expressive
conduct is permissible if the regulation furthers an important or
substantial government interest.140 Similarly here, an advocate
of the Third Circuit’s approach might argue that conduct could be
protected as speech unless there is an important or substantial
governmental interest that weighs against the individual interest
of the speaker. This approach is problematic for two reasons.
First, a balancing test allows for even more discretion and
uncertainty than an inquiry into particularization.141 Second,
precisely because every individual has the ability to act and to
come up with any message at all for the conduct, courts cannot
afford to presume that all conduct is speech. In short, some level
of particularization is necessary to recognize conduct as speech,
which is one of the benefits of the Eleventh Circuit’s test.
139

391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Id. at 376–77.
141
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals
that it has applied a spectrum of standards . . . .”).
140
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By eliminating the particularized requirement, the Third
Circuit shifts the burden of determining whether conduct is
protected as speech to the second prong of the test, which is
audience understanding. However, in the Third Circuit’s case,
that prong is ill-equipped for that purpose. Asking whether the
actors intended for their conduct to communicate a message to
people whom they expected would observe the conduct is
confusing because it could blend actual and potential observers,
which are two separate groups. In other words, do the people
who the actors expected to observe the conduct include actual
viewers, potential viewers, or both? For instance, by hanging the
flag with a peace symbol from his window, the plaintiff in Spence
presumably expected his neighbors to observe his conduct. Some
neighbors may have actually observed the flag, but maybe others
did not, making the latter group only potential viewers.
Blending actual and potential observers is an untenable
position. Asking whether the actors intended their conduct to
communicate to actual observers might yield a different response
than asking whether the actors intended their conduct to
communicate to potential observers.142 The answer to this
question could also differ from case to case, which leads to
inconsistency in applying the test. This is a problem unique to
the Third Circuit, since other courts usually state which audience
they are examining.143 Even in those cases in which courts do not
specifically state whether they are looking at actual or potential
observers, they at least identify a group as the audience.144
Perhaps the Third Circuit would be able to use a few tools to
make its determination, such as imputing an actual audience’s
understanding onto a potential audience rather than surmising
what the latter would understand. Although this would be easy
to apply, it does not seem fair because a potential audience could
understand a completely different message from the actual

142
See Magid, supra note 115, at 485 (stating that two different approaches are
the actual observer standard and the potential observer standard).
143
See Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 320 (2d Cir. 2003) (focusing
on the “ordinary viewer”); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL
33162199, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (focusing on faculty and students by
looking at their reactions to the plaintiff’s way of dressing), aff’d sub nom. Doe v.
Brockton Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30,
2000).
144
See, e.g., Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1270 (11th
Cir. 2004) (looking at “students”).
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audience; this goes against the Third Circuit’s requirement that
the audience understand the same message as the one the actor
intended to convey.
The only room for debate with the Third Circuit’s test could
be whether Spence originally required that the audience
understand the same message the actor intended to convey or
whether the audience could glean a different message from the
conduct.145 There is support for the suggestion that the audience
would have to understand the same message the actor intended
to convey.146 But again, this aspect of the Third Circuit’s test
falls short for two reasons. First, like the Eleventh Circuit
provides, the protection of conduct should not depend on the
audience’s ability to perceive the exact same message that the
actor intended to convey, so long as it could understand some
message. This is especially true if the conduct could convey
multiple messages, yet the actor intended to convey only one
message.147 In that case, what are the chances that the audience
would perceive the exact same message? For example, if
someone is wearing a red, white, and blue necklace and intends
to convey a message about support for the troops, an audience
could understand a message about support for the United States,
not necessarily support for the troops. It is more likely that
someone would understand a message about the former rather
than the latter. Therefore, although this requirement would
maintain the traditional marketplace of ideas because the actor’s
role in expressing a message is more necessary, it would not
maintain the actor’s autonomy, which should not be denied.148

145
Compare Magid, supra note 115, at 486–87 (“Spence requires only that the
observer recognize that the conduct expresses some message, not that he understand
the particular meaning the actor intends.”), with Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4
(finding that the student’s message of gender identity expression by wearing
feminine clothing was understood by the audience).
146
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam) (“An intent
to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by
those who viewed it.” (emphasis added)).
147
See supra Part III.A.
148
See supra Part III.A (discussing how requiring the audience to understand
the same message as the one the actor intended to convey maintains the
marketplace of ideas, allows the audience to understand a different message, and
helps protect autonomy).
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Second, requiring the audience to understand the same
message as the one the actor intended the conduct to convey
demonstrates an inherent contradiction in the Third Circuit’s
approach. On the one hand, the Third Circuit eliminates the
particularized requirement, which would protect more conduct at
the expense of other interests.149 On the other hand, the
requirement that the audience understand the same message the
actor intended the conduct to convey would recognize less
conduct, because it is probable, more often than not, that the
audience gleans a different message than what was intended.
Therefore, the Third Circuit essentially seeks to recognize more
conduct while recognizing less conduct at the same time, which is
a contradiction unique to that circuit.150
Additionally, for the proposition that there are other criteria
to use to determine if the First Amendment will protect conduct,
the court in Tenafly cited only one Third Circuit case, Troster v.
Pennsylvania State Department of Corrections.151 According to
Troster, there was no language in Spence that (1) an intent to
convey a particularized message (2) that would then be
understood by those who viewed it were necessary factors.152
Although this is true, it still ignores the fact that those factors
were relied on in Texas v. Johnson153 and Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence,154 as well as countless lower court
decisions.155 Citing Troster is problematic because the Third
Circuit’s new test could lead to many different, unanticipated
problems, since it may not have been used much. Even though
the Spence factors are still “signposts,”156 the court did not make

149

See supra Part III.B.
The Eleventh Circuit (1) lowers the particularized requirement and
(2) allows the audience to understand a different message from the one the actor
intended to convey, both protecting more speech. See supra Part III.A. Conversely,
the Second Circuit (1) keeps a higher particularized requirement and (2) requires
the audience to understand the same message the actor intended to convey, both
limiting what speech is protected. See infra Part III.C.
151
65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995).
152
Id. at 1090 n.1.
153
491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989).
154
468 U.S. 288, 305 (1984).
155
See, e.g., Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
205 (2d Cir. 2004); Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003).
156
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2002).
150
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it clear how the factors would be used as signposts. Conversely,
at least the Spence factors have been tested on numerous
occasions.
C.

Criticisms of the Second Circuit: Wrong Textually and PolicyWise

If the Third Circuit’s test may have been correct textually,
but not the best test in terms of protecting an individual’s right
to free speech, the Second Circuit’s test157 is wrong textually and
does not sufficiently protect an individual. By stating that a
particularized requirement is intact after Hurley’s statement
that “a narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition
of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a ‘particularized message,’ would never reach the
unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock,”158 the
Second Circuit at first glance seems to be applying the same test
as the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, which lowered the particularized
threshold.159 However, by specifically stating that the Spence
factors are intact, the Second Circuit is not lowering the
threshold; instead, it may have provided an understanding of
what particularized means.160 Maybe the Second Circuit believes
that just a coherent message is needed.
However, there are two problems with this thought. First,
Hurley did not simply clarify what “particularized” means;
instead, Hurley lowered the threshold.
In fact, if the
particularized requirement were merely clarified, Hurley would
not have been decided the way it was because the parade in
Hurley did not have a coherent message.161 Second, by keeping a
higher level of particularization than the Eleventh Circuit, the
Second Circuit maintains discretion for judges to decide whether
conduct is protected. Judges have to somehow decide whether

157

See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974)
(per curiam)).
159
See supra notes 60–61, 69–70 and accompanying text.
160
See Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205 n.6 (“[W]e are mindful of Hurley’s caution against
demanding a narrow and specific message . . . .”).
161
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 569–70 (“[A] private speaker does not forfeit
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to
edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the
speech.”).
158
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something is particularized highly enough, which leads to
inconsistency. For instance, while expressing cultural values by
wearing a skirt was not particularized enough,162 neither was the
even vaguer message of needing money while panhandling.163
Yet, a message about training and technique, and beauty and
creativity through fighting, was considered particularized.164 If
individuals are not sure whether their intent is particularized
enough, they may not act at all, leading to a chilling effect on
speech.165 At least with a lower particularized requirement,
there is less discretion in deciding whether conduct is minimally
particularized.
The Second Circuit, however, does address one of the
problems of the Third Circuit’s test:
Eliminating the
particularized requirement will protect too much conduct.166 If
conduct will only be protected where the actor intends to convey
a particularized message, then conduct where the actor intends
to convey a generalized and vague idea will not receive First
Amendment protection.167 Since an audience is more likely to
understand the actual message the actor intended to convey if
the message is more particularized,168 the Second Circuit helps
maintain the traditional conception of the marketplace of ideas,
where the actor plays a more important role in expressing a
message.169
But, in the name of preserving the marketplace of ideas, the
Second Circuit’s test stifles autonomy in two ways: (1) by not
lowering the particularized requirement, and (2) by requiring
that the audience understand the same message as the one the
actor intended to convey. On the contrary, if the actor’s intent in

162

Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319–20 (2d Cir. 2003).
Young v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1990).
164
Jones v. Schneiderman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 322, 333–34 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
165
See BOLLINGER, supra note 126.
166
See supra Part III.B; see also City of Dall. v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)
(“It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a person
undertakes . . . but such a kernel is not sufficient to bring the activity within the
protection of the First Amendment.”).
167
See Zalewska, 316 F.3d at 319. There, the plaintiff wore a skirt to express
her cultural values. Id. The Second Circuit ruled that this is too broad of a message
to convey, and so would not receive constitutional protection. Id. at 319–20.
168
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
169
See supra Part III.A (discussing how requiring the audience to understand
the same message as the one the actor intended to convey protects the marketplace
of ideas).
163

FINAL_TOMASIK

288

10/7/2015 7:13 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:265

conveying a message no longer needs to be so particularized, and
if an audience understands a different message from the one the
actor intended to convey, which are the two requirements
according to the Eleventh Circuit, people are more likely to
express themselves because there is less fear that their conduct
will not be recognized as speech.170
IV. WHY THE DIFFERENCES MATTER: APPLICATION OF THE TESTS
The Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have all addressed
the question of whether conduct is protected as symbolic speech
These interpretations differ in very
quite differently.171
important respects, from how particularized the message needs
to be to whether the audience needs to understand the same
message the actor intended the conduct to convey. This has
important policy implications, for it could either deter or
encourage speech. The following case illustrates the different
tests and the importance of these differences.
A.

Teenagers and Online Pictures

The case examined under the three different tests is T.V. ex
rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Community School Corp.172 In T.V.,
teenage girls took pictures of themselves in sexually suggestive
positions and subsequently posted them on the Internet.173
Because of these photographs, the girls were suspended from
The girls brought an action,
extracurricular activities.174
claiming that their suspension violated their rights to free
speech.175 The teenagers said they posted the photographs
because they thought the photographs were funny, and the
teenagers wanted to share that.176 The court held that the First
Amendment protected the girls’ conduct because “the
images . . . had a particularized message of crude humor likely to
be understood by those they expected to view the conduct.”177
The court found a particularized message of crude humor

170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part II.
807 F. Supp. 2d 767 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
Id. at 772.
Id. at 773.
Id. at 771.
Id. at 772.
Id. at 776.
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because the photographs themselves were silly and
inflammatory, which could be at the heart of humor for many
teenagers, and because they were staged.178
B.

Application of the Different Tests

1.

The Third Circuit

Applying the different tests to T.V. would each yield a
different outcome. Under the Third Circuit’s test, the conduct of
staging sexually suggestive poses and posting them on the
Internet would be protected because it is sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication. There was the intent to convey a
message of crude humor to teenagers whom the girls expected
would observe the images. There was a great likelihood that the
audience would understand that same message because,
according to the court, the poses were funny and provocative for
teenagers.179
2.

The Second Circuit

On the contrary, under the Second Circuit’s test, this activity
may not be protected as speech because the teenage girls’ conduct
does not have a particularized message. Instead, the message
about crude humor seems rather broad. Just as in Zalewska v.
County of Sullivan,180 a message about cultural values was too
broad,181 and in Young v. New York City Transit Authority,182 a
message that a beggar on a subway needs money was too
generic,183 here, a message of crude humor also seems too broad.
Yet, because of the wide degree of discretion this test affords
judges, perhaps being funny could be considered particularized
enough for a judge.184 This is a problem because if individuals do
not know if their conduct will be considered speech, they may
choose not to act at all.185

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 775–76.
Id. at 776.
316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 319.
903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990).
Id. at 153.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part III.C.
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The Eleventh Circuit

Unlike the Second Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit’s test would
protect this activity, and rightly so. The girls’ conduct would be
recognized as symbolic speech because a reasonable observer is
likely to understand some message from the plaintiffs’ conduct.
As stated by the court, an audience is likely to understand the
humor behind the girls’ conduct because it is consistent with the
audience’s idea of humor at that age.186 Perhaps a reasonable
observer could have understood a different message from the one
the plaintiffs intended to convey. For instance, the teenagers
may have intended to convey a message of humor, but a
reasonable observer could have understood the girls’ conduct to
convey that they are promiscuous. Yet, the conduct would still be
protected.
The distinction between these tests is very important for the
individual. The message behind posing in sexually suggestive
positions could contribute an idea about the sexuality of teenage
girls to the marketplace of ideas. But, if teenagers interpreted a
different message from the pictures, the traditional conception of
the marketplace of ideas is altered, since the teenage girls’ role is
lessened.
The Eleventh Circuit’s approach overcomes this
potential shortcoming by protecting people’s autonomy in
expressing themselves, such as the teenage girls in T.V. “The
fact that . . . ‘offensive’ speech here may not address ‘important’
topics [such as] ‘ideas of social and political significance,’ . . . does
not mean that it is less worthy of constitutional protection.”187
CONCLUSION
In the seminal case of Spence v. Washington, the Supreme
Court laid out a two-factor test to determine if conduct would be
protected as symbolic speech under the First Amendment:
(1) there was an intent to convey a particularized message, and
(2) in the surrounding circumstances, the likelihood was great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.188
Years later, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, the Supreme Court stated that “a narrow,
186
See T.V. ex rel. B.V. v. Smith-Green Cmty. Sch. Corp., 807 F. Supp. 2d 767,
775–76 (N.D. Ind. 2011).
187
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 87 (1976) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
188
418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam).
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succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a
‘particularized message,’ would never reach the unquestionably
shielded painting of Jackson Pollock.”189 Since then, lower courts
have interpreted Hurley’s impact on the Spence factors
differently. While some circuits have concluded that the Spence
factors are intact and perhaps just clarified, others have
interpreted Hurley to completely eliminate the “particularized”
requirement, while others have assessed Hurley to lower the
“particularized” threshold. However, Hurley clearly lowers the
threshold so that only some sort of message is required; Hurley
would not have been decided the way it was if the test were
otherwise. Because the “particularized” threshold is lowered, an
observer should be able to understand a different message from
the one the actor intended to convey. The Eleventh Circuit
captures this new standard best, which helps protect an actor’s
autonomy. However, until the Supreme Court clarifies Hurley’s
impact on Spence, the confusion will continue.

189

515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) (citation omitted) (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 411).

